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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

BECKY LYNNE DRAPER,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 20040879-CA

INTRODUCTION
This case is before the Court for interlocutory review of two issues: (1)
whether the child endangerment statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5 (2003) is
unconstitutionally vague as applied to Ms. Draper in violation of due process; and
(2) whether the district court erred in refusing to quash the bindover of Ms. Draper
on one count of child endangerment. Although the state charged Ms. Draper with
child endangerment based on its theory that drugs found in her house endangered
the child, the state agrees that the magistrate bound Ms. Draper over on the charge
of child endangerment based solely on the state's theory that Ms. Draper
endangered her child through nursing. State's brief at 9. Accordingly, this Court
can uphold the bindover, challenged by Ms. Draper in Point II, only if there is
probable cause to believe Ms. Draper committed the crime of child endangerment
by nursing her child.

1

Although the magistrate refused to bind Ms. Draper over on the charge of
child endangerment based on the state's theory that the child was exposed to drugs
that were found in the house, the state's "drugs in the house" theory is
nevertheless pertinent to Ms. Draper's vagueness as applied argument in Point I.
Because the state pursued a child endangerment charge based on its theory that the
child was exposed to drugs found in the house, Ms. Draper's claim that the child
endangerment statute is vague as applied to her necessarily implicates the state's
"drugs in the house" theory as well as the nursing theory. While Ms. Draper
successfully defended against the drug theory causing the magistrate to refuse to
bind over on that theory, the "drugs in the house" theory nevertheless was applied
to her. Ms. Draper's claim that the statute is vague as applied to her therefore
encompasses the state's claim that she endangered her child because drugs were
found in the house. As set forth more fully in Appellant's opening brief and
below, the child endangerment statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to
Ms. Draper and the evidence failed to establish probable cause to believe she
committed the crime of child endangerment by nursing her child on or about
January 9, 2004.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE CHILD ENDANGERMENT STATUTE IS
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AS APPLIED TO
MS. DRAPER.
In this interlocutory appeal, Ms. Draper challenges the child endangerment
statute as applied to her because the statute fails to give adequate notice and allows
2

for arbitrary enforcement under the circumstances of this case. Because the
charge relied on two theories and forced Ms. Draper to defend against both
approaches, both the "drugs in the house" theory and the nursing theory are
pertinent in determining whether the statute is vague as applied to Ms. Draper.
Since the statute fails to give notice that Ms. Draper's behavior would give rise to
a charge for child endangerment and also fails to establish minimal guidelines for
enforcement under either circumstance, the statute is unconstitutionally vague.
A facial challenge on vagueness grounds will be upheld '"only if the
[statute] is vague in all of its applications.5" State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, Tfl2,
84 P.3d 1171. Where a statute is not vague in all of its applications, it
nevertheless is unconstitutional in violation of due process if it is vague in its
application to the defendant. Id. In other words, when the statute is used to
prosecute a defendant so as to give rise to charges in a context where the statute
does not give notice and/or allows for arbitrary enforcement, the defendant can
challenge the statute as applied to her. See generally State v. Green, 2004 UT 76,
^[45 n. 15, 99 P.3d 820 (indicating that courts examine a statute in light of a
defendant's conduct unless statute is vague in all of its applications); McGee v.
Martinez, 555 So. 2d 914, 915 (Fla. Ct. App. 1990) (indicating that a person who
is charged or threatened with prosecution under a statute has a sufficient stake to
pursue adjudication of the constitutionality of the statute). The child
endangerment statute is vague as applied to Ms. Draper because it fails to give
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notice and allows arbitrary enforcement in the two areas the state used to
prosecute her.
Although for purposes of the vagueness review, the state would like to
discard its theory that Ms. Draper committed child endangerment because drugs
were in the house, the record demonstrates that the child endangerment statute was
applied to Ms. Draper using this theory. In fact, at the preliminary hearing the
state argued only that the drugs in the house theory supported the child
endangerment charge. R. 179:28-29. While the magistrate refused to bind
Ms. Draper over on this theory, Ms. Draper nevertheless was forced to appear and
defend against this application of the statute. The trial judge recognized that the
statute, as applied to Ms. Draper, incorporated both the drug theory and the
nursing theory when he focused on both approaches in analyzing the statute.
R. 165. The trial court upheld the constitutionality of the child endangerment
statute as applied to Ms. Draper, stating (1) "the marijuana, bongs and pipes lay
open or were visible and the child was not protected from them"; and (2) "an
inference that the Defendant was using drugs prior to nursing her child is
reasonable" and the statute might therefore apply. R. 165. For purposes oft
determining whether the child endangerment statute, as applied to Ms. Draper,
passes constitutional muster, both of the state's theories are therefore relevant, as
recognized by the trial judge.
In assessing whether the child endangerment statute is unconstitutionally
vague, this Court must determine whether the statute is sufficiently precise so as to
4

give notice that the conduct is punishable under the statute and also so as to
preclude arbitrary enforcement in both of the contexts utilized by the state in this
case. Although the state tries to characterize the issue as solely a question of
whether Ms. Draper has a constitutionally protected right to "smok[e] marijuana
and then breast-feed[ ] her baby" (state's brief at 11), the issue presented in this
case is more defined and precise than the state's gross simplification. Instead, in
the context of the nursing theory, the issue is whether the language of the child
endangerment statute which outlaws allowing a child to be exposed to a controlled
substance gives adequate notice that breast feeding a child at some point after
ingesting marijuana can be prosecuted under the statute, and perhaps more
importantly, whether the "exposed to" language leaves judges, prosecutors and
police officers to decide whether a defendant's behavior in breast feeding at some
point after ingesting marijuana allowed her child to be exposed to a controlled
substance. Moreover, because the state also utilized the statute to prosecute
Ms. Draper for child endangerment based on drugs found in the house, this Court
must determine whether the statute also gives adequate notice and/or allows for
arbitrary enforcement in that context.
While the state would like this Court to adopt its generalization that
children of drug users are always endangered and mothers who use marijuana at
some point then nurse always endanger their children (see state's brief at 23), due
process requires more precision. In fact, the state's discussion regarding the
heightened risks and dangers to children of illicit drug abusers on page 23 of its
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brief suggests that the state believes that child endangerment charges could be
upheld simply because a parent is a drug user because such a parent exposes the
child to controlled substances. Rather than supporting the state's argument that
the term "exposed to" is not unconstitutionally vague, this discussion actually
highlights the vagueness of the term "exposed to" since the state seems to argue
that Ms. Draper's child was "exposed to" controlled substances and danger simply
because she was a parent who had used marijuana at some point. Pursuant to the
state's argument, all parents who have used illegal drugs could be charged with
child endangerment in addition to drug related charges because such parents have
exposed their children to controlled substances. Such an expansive reading of the
child endangerment statute impinges on the two touchstones of the due process
vagueness protection by failing to give notice and at the same time giving rise to
arbitrary enforcement.
The trial court in this case decided that the statute was not vague as applied
to Ms. Draper because drugs and paraphernalia were laid open or visible, and the
child was therefore exposed to the items. R. 165.1 According to this rationale,
any drugs which are visible in a house would give rise to a child endangerment
charge regardless of whether the child was able to see the drugs or was actually
endangered by them. As outlined in Appellant's opening brief, such an
1

Assuming the definition for expose is "to lay open," under the language of the
statute, it is the child that must be exposed to or laid open, not the drugs. The trial
court's conclusion that the drugs were visible or laid open essentially concludes
that the drugs were exposed to the child and not that the child was exposed to the
drugs, as required by the statute for there to be a violation.
6

application of the child endangerment statute fails to give notice that conduct can
be prosecuted under the statute and also fails to establish minimal guidelines for
enforcement.
Applying the child endangerment statute based on the state's nursing theory
also violates due process in the context of this case. Because there is no evidence
that Ms. Draper nursed her child in close proximity to her use of marijuana nor
that any marijuana residue passed to the child or created a risk or danger for the
child, the state is relying on an undefined and expansive reading of the word
"expose." The state is applying the word "expose" in this context to indirect
conduct that might or might not have some effect on the child, without any
evidence supporting an actual impact. Under such circumstances, the statute is
unconstitutionally vague.
While multiple meanings might not render a statute unconstitutionally
vague, terms in a statute that leave prosecutors and police officers free to decide
what conduct is prohibited and which fail to give a person of ordinary intelligence
notice do render a statute unconstitutionally vague. In this case where the state
has used the statute to prosecute Ms. Draper without any showing of impact, harm,
potential harm or effect, the term "expose" has been given such an expansive
reading that it is rendered unconstitutional.
POINT II. THE EVIDENCE FAILED TO ESTABLISH
PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE MS. DRAPER EXPOSED HER
CHILD TO CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES BY NURSING HER.
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As the state concedes, the only theory that can be used in support of its
child endangerment charge against Ms. Draper is the theory that Ms. Draper
endangered her child by nursing her. State's brief at 9. Because the magistrate
refused to bind Ms. Draper over based on the state's "drugs in the house" theory,
that theory cannot be considered in determining whether to uphold the bindover.
Evidence that Ms. Draper nursed her child on January 20 along with her
admission that she used marijuana on January 9 failed to establish probable cause
to believe that she "exposed" her child to marijuana because (1) the state failed to
introduce reliable evidence that marijuana could be transmitted through breast
milk so as to expose a child to controlled substance, and (2) the state failed to
establish probable cause to believe that, even if marijuana would pass through
breast milk so as to expose a child, Ms. Draper subsequently nursed her child in
close enough proximity to her marijuana use so as to expose the child. See
Appellant's opening brief at 37-47. Rather than pointing to specific evidence
establishing probable cause to believe that Ms. Draper exposed her child to
marijuana by nursing her in close proximity to her drug use, the state asks this
Court to speculate that Ms. Draper must have nursed her child shortly after
ingesting marijuana and that such nursing was harmful as a matter of law.
The state's request that this Court assume that Ms. Draper breast fed her
baby shortly after ingesting marijuana and that if that were the case, she
necessarily "exposed" her child to marijuana demonstrates the breadth and
limitless application of the state's definition for the term "exposed to." Moreover,
8

it shows that the bindover cannot be upheld because the state did not present
specific evidence supporting its charge.
Although there is no evidence that Ms. Draper nursed her child shortly after
she used marijuana, the state asks this Court to speculate that she must have
"breast-fed her baby on the day she smoked marijuana two or three weeks earlier."
State's brief at 28. While the district court drew the "inference" that Ms. Draper
"was using drugs prior to nursing the child" (R. 168), the evidence shows only that
Ms. Draper used marijuana on January 9 and eleven days later on January 20,
nursed her child. Nursing mothers often utilize other methods in conjunction with
breast feeding for nourishing their babies. Some mothers supplement with
formula while others pump and freeze breast milk and subsequently feed that milk
to the child. It is just as likely that Ms. Draper or a babysitter fed the child
formula or stored breast milk on January 9 as it is that Ms. Draper breast fed her
baby in close proximity to ingesting marijuana. The state's evidence simply fails
to establish probable cause to believe that she "exposed" her child to marijuana
when there is no evidence as to when she nursed the child following ingestion of
marijuana, other than the evidence showing that she nursed her child eleven days
later.
In addition, the state did not present credible evidence that even if
Ms. Draper had nursed her child in close proximity to her use of marijuana, she
would have exposed her child to marijuana. See Appellant's opening brief at 44.
As outlined in Appellant's opening brief, testimony from the DCFS investigator
9

that she told Ms. Draper about the dangers of nursing when using marijuana was
multiple hearsay that was not presented for the truth of the matter asserted and
instead was presented as part of the investigator's testimony regarding
Ms. Draper's admission. R. 58. The parties understood that the testimony was not
offered as substantive evidence that marijuana passes through breast milk as
demonstrated by the fact that the prosecutor below did not rely on the testimony
and did not argue to the magistrate that the case should be bound over on the
nursing theory, instead arguing only that the "drugs in the house" theory supported
bindover. R. 179:28-29.
Despite the fact that the prosecutor did not rely on the investigator's
testimony or the nursing theory below, the state now argues not only that the
bindover can be upheld on this basis, but also that the multiple hearsay testimony
that was not introduced for the truth of the matter asserted should be treated as
expert testimony because Ms. Draper did not object to it at the preliminary
hearing. State's brief at 29-30. The state ignores the fact, however, that its own
prosecutor was not relying on the investigator's testimony for the truth of the
matter asserted, did not pursue this case on the nursing theory during argument at
the preliminary hearing and did not use the investigator as an expert in this area.
The preliminary hearing transcript demonstrates that the state was pursuing the
charge based on its "drugs in the house" theory; the magistrate rejected that theory
but decided that the bindover was appropriate because Ms. Draper breast fed her
child. Defense counsel should not be required to object at the preliminary hearing
10

to the state's failure to lay a foundation for presenting expert testimony in this
context where the evidence was not presented for that purpose. In addition, the
rules of evidence require a witness to be qualified as an expert in order to present
testimony that requires scientific, technical or specialized knowledge. £ee Utah R.
Evid. 702. The state's failure to present foundation or to qualify the investigator
as an expert in this area or to rely on the testimony to support a nursing theory
precludes reliance on this testimony as specialized expert evidence.
Moreover, defense counsel raised her objection to the evidence in her
motion to quash the bindover, thereby assuring that the trial court could consider
the argument. A district court hearing a motion to quash a bindover does not sit in
an appellate capacity. See State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464 (Utah 1991). The
district court need not give deference to the magistrate and instead "has the
inherent authority and the obligation to determine whether its original
jurisdiction[] has been properly invoked." IcL at 466. While the preservation rule
requires a defendant to present his claim to the district court, it does not preclude a
district court from determining whether jurisdiction was properly invoked
regardless of whether a defendant entered an objection before the magistrate.
The case against Ms. Draper is based on speculation. While she was honest
about her marijuana use on January 9, there is no evidence that she also nursed her
child on that same day or that marijuana passes through breast milk so as to
"expose" a child to a controlled substance. Although the standard for bindover is
low, the state nevertheless must offer more than speculation to support the
11

elements of a charge. In this case where the evidence shows only that Ms. Draper
admitted using marijuana on January 9 and subsequently nursed her child eleven
days later, the state's case is built only on speculation and the charge should
therefore be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Defendant/Appellant Becky Lynn Draper, by and through counsel Joan
Watt and Shannon Romero, respectfully requests that this Court hold that the child
endangerment statute is void for vagueness in violation of due process or, in the
alternative, order that the charge of child endangerment be dismissed because the
state failed to establish probable cause to support the bindover.
SUBMITTED this /*?* day of August, 2005.

JOXN C. WATT
SHANNON N. ROMERO
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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